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1958] RECENT DECISIONS 1219 
TORTS-PRIMA FACIE TORT-LIABILITY FOR INSTIGATION OF POLICE IN-
VESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION-Plaintiff organized a corporation for the 
purpose of collecting funds from the public to aid cancer victims. Defend-
ant, well-known columnist engaged in soliciting money for a rival cancer 
fund, was alleged, inter alia, to have instigated state and federal govern-
ment investigations and prosecutions that resulted in plaintiff being crim-
inally convicted and subsequently acquitted on a new trial after appeal. 
As a consequence of these actions, public confidence had been destroyed in 
plaintiff's cancer fund corporation and it had ceased to function. Plain-
tiff complained that defendant's actions were done with the intention of 
harming plaintiff and had resulted in plaintiff's loss of salary as director 
of the cancer fund corporation, and in plaintiff's loss of his private detec-
tive license. On appeal from an appellate division decision ordering the 
complaint dismissed, held, affirmed. Although generally a lawful act for 
the malicious purpose of harming plaintiff that does harm plaintiff may 
be actionable/ in this type of situation the best interests of the public are 
advanced by exposure of the truth by official action, and such truth should 
l Principal case at 163, citing Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 
N.E. 713 (1934), and Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923). 
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not be shack.led by fear of a civil action for damages. Brandt v. Winchell, 
3 N.Y. (2d) 628, 148 N.E. (2d) 160 (1958). 
The courts, in actions complaining of wrongful instigation or use of 
judicial process, are faced with two opposing policy considerations. On 
the one hand they recognize an interest in being free from unjustifiable 
and vexatious legal proceedings.2 On the other hand the courts realize 
the importance of a policy of encouraging citizens to report apparent 
crimes3 and to have free access to the courts. Consequently actions of the 
type represented by the principal case are generally discouraged4 and 
surrounded by limitations more stringent than in other causes of action.5 
When bringing suit for damages due to instigation or misuse of judicial 
process6 a plaintiff traditionally has had two theories on which to base 
his action: malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The tort of malicious 
prosecution is an ancient and well established action7 designed to rec-
ompense an accused person for injury to his reputation, person, and 
finances due to unwarranted legal proceedings.8 Limited in England to 
actions for prior criminal prosecutions, in this country the action is 
generally extended to cover prior civil proceedings and even administra-
tive proceedings (e.g., revocation of licenses).9 Although there is not com-
plete agreement on the nature of specific elements of this cause of action, 
those elements necessary for recovery because of a prior criminal proceed-
ing are generally held10 to be (1) a prosecution instituted by defendant,11 
(2) a prior termination of the proceedings in favor of the accused (plain-
tiff in the instant action),12 (3) a lack of probable cause for the prosecu-
tion,13 and (4) "malice" or collateral private purpose other than the public 
2Tutton v. Olsen&: Ebann, 251 Mich. 642, 232 N.W. 399 (1930). See 3 TORTS REsrATE· 
l\lENT §653, Introduction (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 645 (1955); Melvin v. Pence, 
(D.C. Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 423. 
3 Melvin v. Pence, note 2 supra, at 428. 
4 Carere v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 259 Mass. 238, 156 N.E. 55 (1927). 
5 Luther v. First Bank of Troy, 64 Idaho 416, 133 P. (2d) 717 (1943). See also Melvin 
v. Pence, note 2 supra, which reasons that a contrary policy would result, in civil cases 
at least, in repeated litigation instead of the first suit being an end to the matter. 
6 Assuming here that the process is correct and regular, as opposed to the situation 
giving rise to an action for false imprisonment. See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 646 (1955). 
7 The leading case is Saville v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 87 Eng. Rep. 725 (1698). 
s Luther v. First Bank of Troy, note 5 supra. See PROSSER, TORTS, ·2d ed., 645 (1955). 
9 Melvin v. Pence, note 2 supra, at 426, 427. See also 3 TORTS REsrATElllENT §675 
and §680 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 662 (1955). Where prior civil process is the subject 
of the complaint, recovery is generally limited to those cases where special injury can be 
shown, Melvin v. Pence, note 2 supra, at 426. 
10 See, generally, Luther v. First Bank of Troy, note 5 supra; Tutton v. Olsen &: 
Ebann, note 2 supra; Ranke v. State, 206 Misc. 569, 134 N.Y.S. (2d) 83 (1954); 3 TORTS 
REsrATEMENT §653 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 646 (1955). 
11 See note 10 supra. Concerning the meaning of "instituted" see Melvin v. Pence, 
note 2 supra, at 427. 
12 Friedman v. Roseth Corp., 190 Misc. 742, 74 N.Y.S. (2d) 733 (1947). 
13 Simpson v. Coastwise Lumber &: Supply Co., 239 N.Y. 492, 147 N.E.· 77 (1925). 
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purpose of bringing a lawbreaker to trial.14 In the principal case malicious 
prosecution would fail even though defendant had malice because there 
is no lack of probable cause for his instigation of official action15 and be-
cause there has not been a complete termination of the prior process in 
plaintiff's favor.10 
The gist of the second traditional tort, abuse of process, is generally 
said to be the improper use of a regular legal process, civil or criminal,17 
for a purpose other than that for which the process was designed.18 Abuse 
of process seems to have developed to redress grievances that malicious 
prosecution could not reach with its strict limitations19 and neither a 
termination of prior proceedings20 nor a lack of probable cause21 need 
usually be shown to maintain this action. However, the elements of this 
tort are not so well defined as those of malicious prosecution. Exactly 
what misuse of process will be grounds for recovery is the subject of contro-
versy.22 The courts frequently say that if the process were used for its 
proper purpose (i.e., not for collateral coercion of some kind23 nor to im-
pose discomfort vindictively24), then no amount of malice or improper 
motive will be grounds for an abuse of process action.25 In th~ principal 
14 Tutton v. Olsen & Ebann, note 2 supra, at 645. 
15 Conviction by a jury, even though later reversed, usually is held to be conclusive 
proof of existence of probable cause. Carere v. F. W. Woolworth Co., note 4 supra. See 
also PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 657 (1955). 
16 Official action, including a consent injunction against plaintiff engaging in the 
charitable subscription business, still stands. The court in the principal case indicated 
its reluctance to consider what it called a "collateral attack upon the official acts of 
public authorities in a litigation to which the authorities are not parties:• Principal 
case at 163. 
17 Ash v. Cohn, ll9 N.J.L. 54, 194 A. 174 (1937). See 3 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §682 (1938). 
18 Rhoades v. Adelman, 145 N.Y.S. (2d) 766 (1955); Tricomi v. Tricomi, 192 Misc. 
763, 81 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1948); Rothbard v. Ringler, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 351 (1947). 
19 The leading case is Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. (N .C.) 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838) 
wherein a cause of action was allowed plaintiff against a defendant who had used a 
debt warrant to coerce plaintiff to give up a ship registry. 
20 Grainger v. Hill, note 19 supra. See also 3 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §682, comment a 
(1938). Cf. Friedman v. Roseth Corp., note 12 supra. 
21 Grainger v. Hill, note 19 supra. See 32 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1948); 3 TORTS R.EsTATE-
MENT §682, comment a (1938). 
22 It is said that the process must be used for some purpose other than that which 
it is designed for. Lader v. Benkowitz, 188 Misc. 906, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 713 (1946); Serxner 
v. Elgart, 196 Misc. 1053, 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 731 (1949). See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 669 (1955); 
but other courts have said that there is also an abuse when process is used for its 
legitimate purpose in a reckless or oppressive way. Smith v. Weeks, 60 Wis. 94, 18 N.W. 
778 (1884), and see dissenting opinion in Deeter v. Riedel, 96 Wis. 158, 71 N.W. II9 (1897). 
23 Grainger v. Hill, note 19 supra. 
24Ash v. Cohn, note 17 supra, where a body execution to enforce an appeal bond 
was used by defendant to hold plaintiff in jail over a weekend although defendant knew 
plaintiff had property which could be attached. 
25 Meisels v. J.C.A. Trading Corp., 189 Misc. 46, 69 N.Y.S. (2d) 720 (1947): Hauser 
v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 7 N.E. (2d) 268 (1937). See King v. Henderson, [1898] A. C. 720; 
and 7 BROOK. L. REV. 123 (1937). 
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case there is indication that legal process was used to accomplish only the 
purpose for which it was designed (i.e., to protect the public by prevent-
ing allegedly improper soliciting of funds in this case) and consequently an 
abuse of process action would not Jie. 
Since in the principal case the plaintiff cannot come within one of 
the accepted categories of tort liability, his only hope for recovery was the 
prima fade tort theory, that intentional infliction of temporal damages 
is a cause of action which requires justification by the defendant if he is 
to escape liability.26 This theory changes the older common law idea that 
bad motives cannot make a lawful act unlawful,27 and is opposed to the 
view that only that action is a tort which falls within one of the particularly 
defined classes or categories of tort.28 In England in the late nineteenth 
century29 and in this country in the early twentieth century30 the principle 
of motives being the essence of unlawfulness was recognized, and in a 
leading case before the United States Supreme Court31 Justice Holmes 
stated this view as the prima fade tort doctrine. The New York courts are 
committed to this unified theory of intentional tort law;32 consequently 
plaintiff in the principal case argued that the otherwise lawful act of 
setting official agencies in motion to investigate or prosecute should not 
be different from any other act which becomes unlawful when done solely 
with bad motives of harming plaintiff.33 But in cases involving instiga-
tion and use of legal process and official action it appears that New York 
courts, at least, will consider important policy arguments connected with 
the specific torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, namely, 
the need to encourage exposure of "those guilty of offenses against the 
public."34 The New York court applied these policy considerations to 
26 Principal case at 162. 
27 See Judge Cooley's statement quoted in PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 21 (1955). 
28 A view attributed to Sir John Salmond. See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 3 (1955). 
29 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B. 598 (1889); Temperton 
v. Russell, [1893] I Q.B. 715; Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495. See also Lumley v. Gye, 
2 El. & Bl. 216, ll8 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853); and cf. Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1. It is 
generally considered, however, that England does not today subscribe to the prima facie 
tort doctrine. See Forkosch, "An Analysis of the 'Prima Facie Tort' Cause of Action," 
42 CoRN. L. Q. 465 at 473 (1957}; Hale, "Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-
feasance," 46 CoL. L. REv. 196 at 197 (1946). 
30 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900); Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 
485, 59 N.E. 125 (1900); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). 
31 Aikens v. Wisconsin, note 30 supra. The first use of the term "prima facie" in 
connection with the extension of tort concept was probably by Wightman, J., in Lumley 
v. Gye, note 29 supra. 
32 Principal case at 163; Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E. (2d) 214 (1953); 
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E. (2d) 401 (1946); 
Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941); Beardsley v. Kilmer, 
supra note 1. Other states accepting the prima facie tort view include Massachusetts, 
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, and North Carolina. See Forkosch, "An Analysis 
of the 'Prima Facie Tort' Cause of Action," 42 CoRN. L. Q. 465 at 479, 480 (1957). 
33 Principal case at 163. 
34 Principal case at 164. 
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deny plaintiff a cause of action in the principal case.35 The prima fade 
tort theory generally calls upon the courts to weigh matters of policy more 
than traditional tort concepts might.36 In so doing, the principal case 
illustrates how the flexible and still developing theory of prima fade tort 
may be limited on its frontiers by many of the same arguments that pre-
vented recovery under the categorical or "pigeon-hole" view of tort liability. 
John H. Jackson 
35 In Friedman v. Roseth Corp., note 12 supra, the Supreme Court for New York 
County refused to extend the prima fade tort theory ~o establish a cause of action for 
instituting actions on contract where the contract actions had not terminated, using 
basically the same reasoning it used to reject malicious prosecution and abuse of process 
counts. 
36 Forkosch, "An Analysis of the 'Prima Fade Tort' Cause of Action," 42 CoRN. L. Q. 
465 at 467 (1957). 
